Hi all. Note to "Securiteam": there's a link to the possible security problem report at the bottom. On Monday 22 September 2008, chromatic wrote: > On Monday 22 September 2008 08:41:31 Michael G Schwern wrote: > > Shlomi Fish wrote: > > > Let's suppose Makefile.PL is world-writable. While the distro is being > > > unpacked, a malicious user writes something like: > > > > > > {{{ > > > system('rm -fr $HOME'); > > > }}} > > > > > > to it, and after you come to the "perl Makefile.PL" stage - you lose > > > your home-directory. ;-) > > > > Run that by me again how the Makefile.PL being world-writable has any > > effect on that? If a Makefile.PL does an "rm -rf $HOME" and you run it, > > it doesn't matter what permission flags are on the file. Your home > > directory is gone. > > There's a race condition attack between the time the CPAN client *writes* > the world-writeable file and the time the CPAN client *executes* the > world-writeable file. During that time, anyone on the system can write > anything to the file, replacing its legitimate and safe contents with > malicious contents. > > That's completely orthogonal to the problem of the Build.PL/Makefile.PL > containing malicious code. > Right. I decided that it was a major problem with how CPANPLUS handles such situations (regardless to whether we are smoking or just installing) and reported it here: http://rt.cpan.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=39516 Please don't keep it more public than it is already until there's a good fix. Regards, Shlomi Fish ----------------------------------------------------------------- Shlomi Fish http://www.shlomifish.org/ My Aphorisms - http://www.shlomifish.org/humour.html Shlomi, so what are you working on? Working on a new wiki about unit testing fortunes in freecell? -- Ran EilamThread Previous | Thread Next